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HUMAN ERRORS IN PROCESS CONTROL
Jens Rasmussen
"Knowledge and error flow
from the same mental sources,
only success can tell the one
from the other."
Ernst Mach 1905
Position paper for NATO Workshop on the Origin of Human Error,
September 1983, Bellagio, Italy.
This is an internal report.  It may contain results or conclusions that are only preliminary
and should therefore be treated accordingly.  It is not to be reproduced or quoted in publica-
tions , or forwarded to persons unauthorized to receive it.
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1DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN ERRORS
Basically it is very difficult to give a satisfactory definition of human errors.
Frequently they are identified after the fact: If a system performs less
satisfactorily than it normally does due to a human act or to a disturbance
which could have been counteracted by a reasonable human act – the cause
will very likely be identified as a human error.  When compared with technical
components, human operators have some peculiar features which must be
analysed more closely to see whether the present general. attitude towards
faults and errors is reasonable and expedient.  How are faults and errors
defined?
Faults and errors cannot be defined objectively by considering the perform-
ance of humans or equipment in isolation.  They can only be defined with ref-
erence to human intentions or expectations; they depend upon somebody's
judgement of the specific situation.  Faults and, errors are not only caused by'
changes in performance with respect to the normal or accepted performance,
but also by changes of the criteria of judgements; i.e. changes in requirements
to system performance, in safety requirements, or in legal conventions, will be
able to turn hitherto accepted performance into erroneous acts.
In the present man-machine context we can define faults and errors as causes
of unfulfilled system purposes.  If system performance is judged below the ac-
cepted, present standard, somebody will typically try to backtrack the causal
chain to find the causes.  How far back to seek is a rather open question; gen-
erally, the search will stop when one o r more changes are found which are
familiar and therefore acceptable as explanations, and to which something
can be done for correction.  In the case of a technical break-down, a "compo-
nent" failure is generally accepted as the cause at the component level where
replacement is convenient.  In some cases, however, component failure will
not be found an acceptable cause; for example, if it occurs too frequently. In
such cases, the search will often continue to fin the “root-cause” of' the com-
ponent's malfunction.  In summary, the characteristics of a fault are: It is the
cause of deviation from a standard; it is found on the causal path back from
this effect; it is accepted as a familiar and therefore reasonable explanation;
and a cure is known.  In all these respects, the human operator is in an un-
lucky position.  Due to human complexity, it is generally very difficult to "pass
through" a person in causal explanations.  In addition, it is generally accepted
that "it is human to err" and finally, you can always ask people to "try
harder".
This means that allocation of causes to people or technical 'parts in the sys-
tem is a purely pragmatic question regarding the stop rule applied for analysis
after the fact.  Ultimately, a thorough analysis will always end up with a hu-
man error, probably during design or manufacture, or by an act of God.
2ERRORS AS UNSUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENTS IN AN UNKIND ENVIRONMENT
A more fruitful point of view is to consider human errors as instances of man-
machine or man-task misfits.  In case of systematic or frequent misfits, the
cause can then typically be considered a design error.  Occasional misfits are
typically caused by variability on part of the system or the man and can be
considered system failures or human errors, respectively.
However, human variability is an important ingredient in adaptation and -
learning and the ability to adapt to peculiarities in system performance and
optimize interaction is the very reason for having people in a system.  To op-
timize performance, to develop smooth and efficient skills, it is very important
to have opportunities to "cut corners", to perform trial and error experiments,
and human errors can in a way. be considered as unsuccessful experiments
with unacceptable consequences.  Typically they are only classified as human
errors because they are performed in an “unkind” work environment. An un-
kind work environment is then defined by the fact that it is not possible for a
man to correct the effects of inappropriate variations in performance before
they lead to unacceptable consequences.  Typically, because he either cannot
immediately observe the effect's of his "errors", or because they are irreversi-
ble.
The interaction can be seen as a complex, multidimensional de-
mand/resource fit.  To discuss the misfits and evaluate means for improve-
ment, it is more important to find the nature or dimensions of the misfits than
to identify their causes.  In other words, it is necessary to find what went
wrong rather than why.
With respect to man-system misfits, human variability can play a role in two
different ways.  First, mismatch may occur when human variability brings
human actions on the system outside the boundary allowing continued ac-
ceptable system function.  Second, adaptability and variability of human be-
haviour may not be large enough to maintain a match, following changes in
system behaviour.  To explain man-system mismatch we must therefore look
@at the control of -human behaviour, to find mechanisms behind variability
during normal, familiar situations and mechanisms limiting adaptability in
unfamiliar situations when the system changes.
THE SKILL-RULE-KNOWLEDGE FRAMEWORK
To discuss the interaction between an occasionally changing system and a
varying and adaptable human, we have to consider the different ways human
behaviour can be controlled, depending upon the degree of familiarity of the
3environment. For this purpose we consider three different levels of control, as
shown on Figure 1, the levels of skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based behaviour.
Figure 1
4The skill-based behaviour represents sensori-motor performance during acts
or activities which, following a statement of an intention take place without
conscious control as smooth, .automated and highly integrated patterns of
behaviour.
At the skill-based level the perceptual-motor system acts as a multivariable,
continuous control system synchronizing the physical activity such as navi-
gating the body through the environment and manipulating external objects
in a time-space domain.  For this control the sensed information is perceived
as time-space signals, continuous, quantitative indicators of the time-space
behaviour of the environment.  These signals have no meaning or significance
except as direct physical time-space data.  The performance at the skill-based
level may be released or guided by value features attached by prior experience
to certain patterns in the information not taking part in the time-space con-
trol but acting as cues or signs activating the organism.  Performance is based
on feedforward control and depends upon a very flexible and efficient dynamic
internal world model.
At the next level of rule-based behaviour, the composition of a sequence of
subroutines in a familiar work situation is typically controlled by a stored rule
or procedure which may have been derived empirically during previous occa-
sions, communicated from other persons' know-how as an instruction or
cookbook recipe, or it may be prepared on occasion by conscious problem
solving and planning.  The point is here that performance is goal-oriented,
bull structured by "feedforward control" through a stored rule.  Very often, the
goal is not even explicitly formulated, but is found implicitly in the situation
releasing the stored rules.  The control is teleological in the sense that the
rule or Control is selected from previous successful experiences.  The control
evolves by "survival of the fittest" rule.  Furthermore, in actual life, the goal
will only. be reached after a long sequence of acts, and direct feedback cor-
rection considering the goal may not be possible.
At the rule-based level, the information is typically perceived as Signs.  The
information perceived is defined as a sign when it serves to activate or modify
predetermined actions or manipulations.  Signs refer to situations or proper
behaviour by convention or prior experience; they do not refer to concepts or
represent functional properties of the environment.  Signs are generally la-
belled by names which may refer to states or situations in the environment or
to goals and tasks of a person.  Signs can only be used to select or modify the
rules controlling the sequencing of skilled subroutines; they cannot be used
for functional reasoning, to generate new rules, or to predict the response of
an environment to unfamiliar disturbances.  During unfamiliar situations,
faced with an environment for which no know-how or rules for control are
available from previous encounters, the control of performance must move to
a higher conceptual level, in which performance is goal-controlled, and
5'knowledge-based.  In this situation, the goal is explicitly formulated, based
on an analysis of the environment and the overall aims of the person. -Then a
useful plan is developed - by selection, such that different plans are consid-
ered and their effect tested against the goal, physically by trial and error, or
conceptually by means of understanding of the functional properties of the
environment and prediction of the effects of the plan considered.  At this level
of functional reasoning, the internal structure of the system is explicitly rep-
resented by a "mental model" which mav take several different forms.
To be useful for causal functional reasoning in order to predict or explain un-
familiar behaviour of the environment, information must be perceived as
symbols. While signs refer to percepts and rules for action, symbols refer to
concepts tied to functional properties and can be used for reasoning and
computation by means of a suitable representation of such properties.  Signs
have external reference to states of and actions upon the environment, but
symbols are defined by and refer to the internal, conceptual representation
which is the basis for reasoning and planning.
Within this framework we will discuss different typical mechanisms which can
lead to man-system mismatch.
MECHANISMS BEHIND MAN-SYSTEM MISMATCHES
Discussing these mechanisms, we are considering those occasions when a
man-system interaction is judged a mismatch which needs correction - either
by the person himself or by somebody else, we are not considering the suc-
cess of the correction - i.e. the ultimate effect of the mismatch.  Typically,
mismatches are corrected immediately by the person, but the success of the
correction depends very much upon qualities of the task and environment,
such as observability and reversibility, and must be 'discussed separately
from the mechanisms behind the initial mismatch which led to a corrective
action or adaptive change in behaviour.
Human Variability during Familiar Tasks
We will first consider intrinsic human variability which leads to mismatches
during normal work situations, i.e. we consider the effect of variability upon
skill- and rule-based behaviour.
Motor variability.  The time-space precision of sensori-motor control may not
be adequate for the task at hand, leading to occasional mismatches.
Examples:
- Inadequate precision leads to short-circuit of terminals with screw
driver.
6- Inadequate precision in replacement of relay cover leads to short-
circuit of relay terminals.
- Varying use of force in manipulating a bank of valves occasionally
leaves a valve leaking.
Topographic mis-orientation is another mechanism of mismatches during
sensori-motor performance, occurring when the internal world model of some
cause looses synchronism with the external world.
Examples:
-A failure in one of several pump trains in the basement leads to the
decision in the control room to switch off the "north train".  How-
ever, during passage down stairs an operator looses orientation and
switches off the southern train, even though he has the proper in-
tention.
These are mechanisms within a single motor schema; other mechanisms are
related to the fact that skilled operators have a large repertoire of schemas,
and that a schema may involve a long sequence of acts.  A single conscious
statement of intention may activate a schema, whereafter the attention may
be directed towards planning of future activities or monitoring the past.  The
current, unmonitored schema will then be sensitive to interference leading to
stereotype-take-over.  This means another schema takes over the control, ei-
ther because a part of current action sequence is also part of another fre-
quently used schema, or due to interfering intentions of the detached atten-
tion.
Examples: -
- During normal operation of a process plant the power supply to
the instrumentation disappears.  Investigation reveals that the
manual main circuit breaker in the power supply is in the off posit--
'on.  The conclusion was that a roving operator, checking cooling
towers and pumps, inadvertently had switched from a routine
check-round to the Friday afternoon shutdown check-round and
turned off the supply.  The routes of the two check-rounds are the
same, except that-, he is supposed to pass by the door of the gen-
erator room on the routine check,  but to enter and turn off the
supply on the shutdown checks.  Something "en route" obviously
has conditioned him for shutdown check (sunshine and day
dreams?).  The operator was not aware of his action, but did not re-
ject the explanation.
- An experimental plant shuts down automatically during normal
operation due to inadvertent manual operation of a cooling system
shut-off valve.  The valve control switch is placed behind the oper-
ating console, and so is the switch of a flood-light system, used for
7special operations monitored through closed circuit television.  The
switches are neither similar nor closely positioned.  The operator
has to pass the valve switch on his way to the flood-light switch.  In
this case the operator went behind the console to switch off the flood
light, but operated the shut-off valves which caused plant shutdown
through the interlock system.
- During start-up of a process plant, the plant is automatically shut
down during manual adjustment of a cooling system.  During start-
up the operator monitored the temperature of the primary cooling
system and controlled it by switching off and on the secondary
cooling pumps to avoid water condensation in the primary system
due to the cold cooling water.  On this occasion, he observed the
temperature to pass the low limit, signalling a demand to switch off
the secondary pumps, while he was talking to co-operator about an-
other matter over the phone.  He then switched off -,he primary
pumps and the plant immediately shut down automatically.  He did
not recognize the cause immediately, but had to diagnose the situa-
tion from the warning signals.  The control keys for the two sets of
pumps are positioned far apart on the console.  However, a special
routine exists, during which the operator the primary pumps on and
off to  allow an operator in the basement to adjust pump valves after
pump overhaul while they communicate by phone.  Is the event
caused by schema interference due to the phone call?
Since the repertoire of automated sensori-motor schemas and their complex-
ity increases with ' the skill which operators develop during their daily inter-
action with their system, the role of this kind of mismatch becomes more im-
portant with their experience, and can only be counteracted by making sys-
tems more “error" tolerant.
At the rule-based level, human variability during performance of the normal,
familiar tasks is most frequently found as incorrect recall of rules and know-
how.  A characteristic category is forgetting an isolated item, i.e. which is not
an integrated part of a larger memory structure.  Typical is omission of an
isolated act which is not a necessary part of the main task sequence.
The fact that the omitted steps are frequently unrelated to the verbal label of
the task may be a condition directly contributing to their frequency.  Analysis
of industrial fires led Whorf (1956) to the conclusion that "the name of a
situation affects behaviour".
Examples are abundant:
- "Jumpers" not removed from terminals after repair, switches not
turned back to "operation" after instrument calibration; by-pass
valves not reopened after pump repair; cables not reconnected after
instrument repair, etc.
8In an analysis of test and calibration reports from nuclear plant, it was found
(Rasmussen, 1980) that this category accounted for 50% of the analysed re-
ports.  The high frequency can be due to high initial probability, but can also
be due to the fact that the isolated acts are less likely to be observed and cor-
rected immediately by the person.
A closely related mechanism is the incorrect recall of isolated items, such as
quantitative figures, numbers, etc.
Examples:
- Incorrect recall of numbers of valves and switches.
- Incorrect recall of figures, such as calibration references, set-
points, instrument readings.
Another frequent mechanism of variability during familiar tasks is the mis-
take among alternatives, which frequently appears as incorrect choice of one
of a couple of possible alternatives to use, such as left-right, up-down, plus-
minus, A-B, etc.
Examples:
- Using positive correction factors instead of negative; using in-
creasing, instead of decreasing signal in calibration.
- Disconnect pump A instead of B.
These are all mismatch events caused by human variability in normal, famil-
iar task situations.  Other mechanisms lead to mismatch, when humans fail
to adapt adequately to variations and changes in the task environment.
Improper Human Adaptation to System Changes
The efficiency of human interaction with the environment at the skill-based
level is due to a high degree of fine-tuning of the sensori-motor schemas to
the time-space features in the environment.  Changes in the environment will
often be met by an updating of the current schema by a subconscious reac-
tion to cues or a consciously expressed intention: "Now look, be careful, the
road is icy".
However, frequently the updating of the current schema will not take place
until a mismatch has occurred, for instance, when walking onto more uneven
ground, adaptation of the current motor schema to the actual features of the
environment may first happen after the feet have detected the mismatch by
stumbling.  The point here is that adaptation and fine-tuning of sensori-motor
schemas basically depend upon mismatch occurrences for optimal adjust-
ments.  The proper limits for fine-tuning can only be found if surpassed once
in a while.  This means that mismatches cannot - and should not - be
avoided, but a system must be tolerant and not respond irreversibly.  This
discussion relates to mismatches which are needed to control adaptation
within the skill-based level.  More serious mismatch categories are met when
9changes in the environment are not met by proper activation of higher level
control of behaviour.
Two types of mismatch mechanisms are related to improper activation of rule-
based control: stereotype fixation, and stereotype takeover, similar to that dis-
cussed in the previous section.
Stereotype fixation represents the situation when a sensori-motor schema is
activated in an improper context, and the person on afterthought very well
knows what he should have done.  He does not switch to proper rule-based
control.
Examples:
- An operator presses air out of a plastic bag containing dust in or-
der to seal it, although he knows it contains radioactive material.
He gets contaminated in the face.
- During a clean-up operation in a radioactive area, a vacuum
cleaner fails.  A foreman opens it for a possible rapid repair, despite
the fact that he knows it contains radioactive dust.
In both cases, normal everyday reactions are carried over to abnor-
mal context.  Also this appears to be a reasonable and effective
learning mechanism - in a reversible context.  Here the radioactivity
makes the environment "unkind".
In other cases people realize the need for use of special procedures, but re-
lapse to familiar routines, i.e. stereotype takes over because of overlapping se-
quence elements.
Examples:
- You have noticed icy road and decided to drive carefully, but when
a dog enters the road you kick the brake and --.
- An operator enters an emergency procedure and executes a se-
quence of actions correctly but then stops a pump, an act which
follows the sequence in another, more frequently used procedure,
but which is here wrong and risky.
- An airplane is below acceptable altitude approaching a runway.
The pilot orders "full power" and the co-pilot responds correctly but
also retracts landing gear, resulting in a "wheels-up" landing.  The
act follows "full power" in low altitude, during take-off.
Subconscious control of sensori-motor sequences quite naturally has a high
affinity to the very familiar routine sequences which are likely to "capture"
(Norman, 1980) the control.  As we saw previously, this interference can hap-
pen between sets of familiar sequences, but is more probable in less frequent
situations when conscious rule-based control is needed.  This is in particu-
larly the case during situations when the need for forward planning occupies
the conscious attention as soon as the necessary rule has been rehearsed, i.e.
before it has been executed.
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Similar difficulties in proper adaptation to system changes by switching to
knowledge-based behaviour are caused by the reliance on signs during all fa-
miliar situations.  The high efficiency of human interaction with objects and
other persons of everyday life is due to a large repertoire of skilled subroutines
and of rules, know-how for updating, the routines and linking them together.
The control is based on recognition of the state-of-affairs in the environment
in terms of signs, which relates to the appropriate rules by convention or ex-
perience.  Even in direct interaction with the physical environment, will these
signs be convenient correlates in the given context rather than defining at-
tributes.  This makes the interaction susceptible to mistakes if the environ-
ment changes in a way which does not affect the signs, but makes the related
behaviour inappropriate.  This is the basic idea behind all kind of traps.
In the direct interaction with a physical world, identification of signs takes
place by perceptual categorization, which can be based on complex patterns
and therefore also be rather sensitive to changes.  This is typically not the
case for human interaction with complex industrial systems, where operators
are controlling more or less invisible processes.  They have to infer the state
and select proper actions from a set of physical measurements which is sel-
dom presented in a way which allows perceptual identification of the state;
operators are supposed to apply conceptual categorization based on rational
reasoning, i.e. to exhibit knowledge-based reasoning.  For several reasons,
this leads to difficulties for human operators to adapt appropriately to
changes in the system as for instance caused by technical faults.
The use of a set of measured variables requires knowledge of the system in
terms of engineers' conception as a network of quantitative relations among
variables.  Natural language reasoning which is typically used for control of
the systems, is, however, not based on nets of relations among variables, but
upon linear sequences of events in a system of interacting components or
functions.  To circumvent the need for mental effort to derive states and
events from the sets of variables and their relations, operators generally use
indications which are typical for the normal events and states, including in-
formal signals as motor and relay noise, as convenient signs for familiar
states in the system.  This is a very effective and mentally economic strategy
during normal and familiar periods, but leads the operator into traps when
changes in plant conditions are not adequately reflected in his set of signs.
Such mental traps often contribute significantly to the operator's misidentifi-
cation of unfamiliar, complex plant states.  Therefore, to adapt performance to
the requirements of a system in a unique and unfamiliar state, the operators
must not only switch to knowledge-based reasoning based on a mental model
of the system's internal, functional properties; he must also replace his per-
ception of information as signs with an analytical interpretation symbols.
This appears to be very difficult, since the use of signs basically means that
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information from the system is not really observed, but is obtained by "asking
questions" which are heavily biased by expectations based on a set of well-
known situations.
The difficulty in shifting to higher level analytical reasoning is further aggra-
vated when inference must be based on a number of information sources
which are sequentially attended.  From analysis of verbal protocols recorded
by skilled technicians in diagnostic tasks, we found (Rasmussen & Jensen,
1974) several principles in operation which served to minimize memory work-
load.  Reading a sequence of measurements, they did not try to remember the
original observations; each reading was immediately judged according to their
expectations and only the result of the judgement was later to be recalled.
Furthermore, they followed a "way of least resistance" in that they made a de-
cision about what to do next, as soon as a familiar approach seemed to be
possible, without considering the possibility of alternative, more effective
ways.  Rather, there seemed to be a "point of no return" which had the effect
that information observed after a decision would rarely lead to a reconsidera-
tion of the situation.
Taken together, these aspects force one to draw the conclusion that there is a
considerable probability that highly skilled operators with a large repertoire of
convenient signs and related know-how will not switch to analytical reasoning
when required, if they find a familiar subset of data during their reading of in-
struments.  They will rather run into a "procedural trap" and be caught by a
"familiar association shortcut".
Examples from major industrial incidents are legio, but my favourite case
story tells about Lalande, who failed to switch from his rule-based recording
of star positions to an analytical interest for moving stars (quoted from Bruner
et al., 1956) - -
The incident in question occurred in 1795, nine years after the dis-
covery of the planet Uranus, and the principal figure involved was
the great French astronomer Lalande.  In that year Lalande failed to
discover the planet Neptune, although the logic of events should
have led him to it.  Lalande was making a map of the heavens.
Every night he would observe and record the stars in a small area,
and on a following night would repeat the observations.  Once, in a
second mapping of a particular area, he found that the position of
one star relative to others in that part of the map had shifted.
Lalande was a good astronomer and knew that such a shift was un-
reasonable.  He crossed out his first observation of the shifting point
of light, put a question mark next to his second observation, and let
the matter go.  And so, not until half a century later did Neptune get
added to the list' of planets in the solar system.  From the aberrant
movement, Lalande might have made the inference not that an error
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had been made but that a new planet of the solar system was pres-
ent.  But he was reasonable.  And it was more reasonable to infer
that one had made an error in observation than that one had found
a new planet.
Or, from a butadine explosion in Texas City; the investigation considers:
"Loss of butadine from the system through the leaking overhead line
motor valve resulted in substantial changes in tray composition
..."The loss of liquid in the base of the column uncovered the calan-
dria tubes, allowing the tube wall temperature to approach the tem-
perature of the heat supply.  The increased vinylacetylene concen-
tration and high tube wall temperature set the stage for the explo-
sion which followed". ..."The make flow meter showed a continuous
flow; however, the operator assumed that the meter was off calibra-
tion since the make motor valve was closed and the tracing of the
chart was a straight line near the base of the chart.  The column
base level indicator showed a low level in the base of the column,
but ample kettle vapour was being generated."
Given an unstable flow meter, only wisdom after the fact will make you con-
sider a leak.
From the melt-down of fuel elements in a nuclear reactor:
Certain test required several hundred process coolant tubes to be
blocked by neoprene disks. 7 disks were left in the system after the
test, but were located by a test of the gauge system that monitors
water pressure on each individual process tube.  For some reason
the gauge on one tube was overlooked, and it did not appear in a list
of abnormal gauge readings prepared during the test.  There was an
additional opportunity to spot the blocked tube when a later test -
was performed on the system.  This time the pressure for the tube
definitely indicated a blocked tube.  The shift supervisor failed, how-
ever, to recognize this indication of trouble.  The gauge was adjusted
at that time by an instrument mechanic to give a midscale reading
which for that particular tube was false.  This adjustment made it
virtually certain that no flow condition would exist until serious
damage resulted.
Errors during knowledge-based reasoning.  Once an operator has succeeded
in shifting to analytical functional reasoning at the level of knowledge-based
behaviour, it is very difficult to characterize his mental data processing and
the related mechanisms leading to mismatch.
At the skill- and rule-based levels, behaviour is controlled by motor schemas
and know-how rules, the goals are implicitly specified, and “error” mecha-
nisms are described in terms related to established, "normal" action se-
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quences in a rather behaviouristic way.  At the knowledge-based level, this is
not possible.  The sequence of arguments an operator will use during problem
solving cannot be described in general terms, the goal to pursue must be ex-
plicitly considered, and the actual choice depends on very subjective and
situation-dependent features.  At the skill- and rule-based levels, it is known
per definition that adaptation to changes is within the human capability.  This
is not the case when knowledge-based performance is required during com-
plex disturbances.  Therefore, different kinds of mismatch situations may oc-
cur:
- Adaptation is outside the limits of capability, due to requirements
to knowledge about system properties which is not available; to data
which are not presented; or excessive time or workload require-
ments.
- Adaptation is possible, but unsuccessful due to inappropriate de-
cisions, which result in acts upon the system, not conforming with
actual requirements.  It must be noted here that this is only "errors"
if they are not corrected timely; as discussed below actions not con-
forming with system requirements can be an important element
during problem solving.
In the present context only the latter category is considered, and again differ-
ent typical categories of mismatch situations can be found during any of the
necessary phases of the decision making, such as identification of system
state; evaluations and choice of ultimate goals; and planning of proper action
sequence:
- Human variability in a cognitive task, slips of memory, mistakes,
interference from familiar lines of reasoning, etc.  Mechanisms
similar to those discussed above.  They are difficult to identify or to
use in prediction, when the problem solving process is as uncon-
strained as it is in a real life task in a control room.
- Errors caused by the difficulty of keeping track of sequential rea-
soning in a causal structure, which is in fact a complex network,
unsuited for linear reasoning.  The mental workload involved may
lead to adoption of premature hypotheses from the influence of fac-
tors as the "way of least resistance" and the "point of no return",
leading to lack of consideration of important conditions or unac-
ceptable side effects of the ultimate decision.
- Actions not conforming with system requirements may not be re-
lated to the ultimate result of erroneous decision making, but a rea-
sonable act to test a hypothesis or get information which, however,
may bring the system into a more complex and less controllable
state.
- The need for human decision making during disturbed system
conditions basically depends on functional redundancy in the pur-
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pose/function/equipment relationships of the system.  There is a
complex many-to-many mapping between the levels in this hierar-
chy and during search for resources to resolve the various goals in a
complex situation, operators may very likely be caught by familiar or
proceduralized relationships serving goals which are not relevant in
the present situation.  Decision errors during complex disturbances
are not stochastic events, but probably mistakes caused by interfer-
ence in this mapping.
The conclusion is that in present day control rooms based on individual
presentation of the measured variables, the context in which operators make
decision at the knowledge-based level is far too unstructured to allow the de-
velopment of a model of their problem-solving process, and hence, to identify
typical "error" modes, except in very general terms, such as "lack of consid-
eration of latent conditions or side effects" (Rasmussen, 1980).
As a basis for a useful model, the conceptual framework within which the
operators have to make decision, has to be modelled in a consistent way in
terms of the system's purpose/function/equipment hierarchy.  As Simon
notes (Simon, 1956) "the complexity of human behaviour largely reflects the
complexity of his environment Before his behaviour can be modelled, a sys-
tematic description of his decision making context must be found in order to
identify likely interferences.  Secondly, realistic models will probably only be
possible, if his choice of goals and strategies is more constrained and con-
trolled than is the case in present day control rooms.  This is possible if a
computer-controlled presentation of a symbolic framework is developed,
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